Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War

New York / London: New York University Press, 1986. Hardcover. VG- (ex-library w/ stamps to textblock edges, internal stamps w/ usual markings, etc. dustjacket taped to cover edges; ID to lower spine; back cover edge of dj has tear; plastic scuffed). black boards w/ red spine printing. book x, 307 pgs. red dustjacket w/ white & blue printing; protective plastic. From a college library. Pages clean and bright. "Cable succeeds in showing that America's failure in Vietnam was the result of faulty military doctrine, not a loss of will, as Harry Summers asserts in On Strategy (G.P.O., 1981). He sets the stage by reviewing the history of five small 20th-century wars, and the lessons the U.S. military learned from each in developing its doctrine of counterinsurgency war. Too often the lessons were invalid, leading to an almost total misunderstanding of the struggle in Vietnam. This is an excellent addition to the growing number of books critical of basic U.S. military doctrine, one both well researched and well written. It strongly challenges the idea that the United States could have won in Vietnam. For most academic, military, and public libraries, especially larger ones."--Library Journal.