Essays on the powers of the human mind; to which are prefixed, an essay on quantitu, and an analysis of Aristotle’s logic

Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, 1819. LATER EDITION. Engraved portrait of the author in Volume 1. Full contemporary green calf, boards ruled in gilt, spine labels, each cover with blindstamped decoration, all edges marbled;spines and corners worn, some browning, overall a fine set. Later edition. This work collects many of Reid’s essays, including his important Essays on the intellectual powers of man. Also included are essays on memory, conception, abstraction, judgment and reasoning, taste, will, and morals, among others.

Reid’s work formed the basis of the Scottish common-sense school. Reid believed that common sense is, or at least should be, at the foundation of all philosophical inquiry. He disagreed with Hume, who asserted that we can never know what an external world consists of as our knowledge is limited to the ideas in the mind, and George Berkeley, who asserted that the external world is merely ideas in the mind.

By contrast, Reid demonstrates that the objects of perception are not ideas “in the mind” but things in the world. The unit of knowledge is not a mental copy or idea but a judgment about things, such as a judgment entailing reference to a permanent subject and a thing which exists quite apart from whether there are minds to know them. Reid’s renunciation of the abstract particular became fashionable in 20th century logic, where he was held in higher regard than many other philosophers, including Hume (despite Reid’s admiration of Hume).

Reid (1710-1796) was a religiously-trained Scottish philosopher and a founder of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

DNB, XVI, pp. 879-883.